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Introduction
When a firm has the opportunity to make an irreversible investment facing future uncertainty there is an option value of delay. By analogy with a financial call option it is optimal to delay exercising the option to invest, even when it would be profitable to do so at once, in the hope of gaining a higher payoff in the future. Using this insight the real options approach improves upon traditional NPV-based investment appraisal methods by allowing the value of delay and the importance of flexibility to be quantified and incorporated explicitly into the analysis.
Real world investment opportunities, unlike financial options, are rarely backed by legal contracts which guarantee the holder's rights in precise terms. Most real options are nonproprietary investment opportunities whose terms are somewhat vague or subjective, and far from guaranteed. In particular, a firm's ability to hold the option is frequently influenced by the possibility that another firm may exercise a related option, which affects the value of the first firm's investment. In a few instances a legal right such as an oil lease or a patent gives a firm a proprietary right similar to that granted by a financial option. Or occasionally a firm has such a strong market position, as in a natural monopoly or network industry, that its investment opportunities are de facto proprietary. However, in most industries some degree of competition exists, either actual or potential, and the option to invest cannot be held independently of strategic considerations.
When a small number of firms are in competition with an advantage to the first mover, each one's ability to delay is undermined by the fear of preemption. Consider a situation in which two firms have the ability to exercise an option and the first to do so obtains the underlying asset in its entirety, leaving the second mover empty-handed. Each firm would like to exercise the option just before its rival does so, giving rise to discontinuous Bertrandstyle reaction functions. With symmetric firms the value of delay is eliminated and the option will be exercised as soon at the payoff from doing so becomes marginally positive. Under such circumstances the real options approach becomes irrelevant and the traditional NPV rule resurfaces as the appropriate method of investment appraisal.
In order to study in detail the tension between real options and strategic competition, the continuous time framework of Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) is adapted in two important respects to apply to the specific context of rival investment in R&D. The firms' profit functions are specified so as to include two distinct forms of uncertainty: economic uncertainty over the future profitability of the project, and technological uncertainty over the success of R&D investment itself. Economic uncertainty gives rise to option values and a tendency for delay, which would not arise in a deterministic framework. Technological uncertainty, combined with a winner-takes-all patent system, generates a preemption effect that counteracts the incentive to delay. The instantaneous probability of success, or hazard rate, of rival firms captures in a simple form the strength of the first-mover advantage, allowing outcomes for varying degrees of preemption to be readily compared. In effect, technological uncertainty drives a wedge between a firm's decision to invest and the out-turn of that investment, giving some scope for the follower to leapfrog the leader and preserving its option value to some extent. It should be noted that the advantage gained by the first mover is not necessarily a persistent one: if the breakthrough is not achieved before the follower invests, the two firms are equally likely to succeed from then on.
In fact, the hazard rate has two distinct effects in this model. The direct effect of the rival's hazard rate is to reduce the expected value of investment to the second mover, since there is some probability that the leader will make the discovery first. This effect is analogous to the impact of rival investment in product market duopoly models such as Smets (1991) : with the option value of delay unchanged, the reduction in the value of investment causes the follower to act later. In this paper, however, there is also a second effect: the hazard rate of rival innovation reduces the option value itself, tending to hasten investment.
Thus option values and preemption interact in this model. This contrasts with existing contributions in the area, where the roles of option values and competition are additive: in these models the only effect of rivalry is to reduce the value of investment, while the option value of delay remains unchanged.
Focusing on Markov perfect equilibria, the outcome of the non-cooperative two-player game takes one of two forms depending upon parameter values. The first is a preemptive leader-follower outcome in which one firm invests strictly earlier than the other and option values are undermined by competition. The second has a multiplicity of equilibria, including a continuum of symmetric equilibria in which both firms invest at the same trigger point. The
Pareto-dominant equilibrium coincides with the optimal joint-investment rule which would be chosen by firms that agree to adopt a common trigger point. This outcome entails greater delay than the single-firm counterpart.
The role of the hazard rate in non-cooperative equilibrium can be understood as follows.
Its impact in lowering the expected value of investment to the second-mover, relative to the firm that invests first, creates a first-mover advantage that will tend to induce preemptive action. However, when the first firm invests the value of its rival's option to delay is also reduced, speeding up the competitive reaction to its investment. Thus, preemption is double-edged: the leader gains a privileged position for a time, but the option value effect tends to speed up the reaction of its competitor. Anticipating this reaction, a firm may instead choose to delay its own investment. In effect, an investing firm chooses the time at which the patent race will begin and it is better for each firm if this is delayed until the optimal joint-investment point is reached. A good analogy is the behaviour of contestants in a longdistance race, who typically remain in a pack proceeding at a moderate pace for most of the distance, until near the end when someone attempts to break away and the sprint for the finish begins. Compared with existing duopoly models of real options the cooperative jointinvestment outcome is achievable as a non-cooperative equilibrium.
The fully optimising cooperative investment rule is derived as a benchmark for comparison. This is shown to involve sequential investment of the two units, so that research efforts are phased in over time. Compared with the non-cooperative leader-follower equilibrium, the cooperative trigger points are higher than their non-cooperative counterparts since option values are no longer undermined by preemption. The non-cooperative jointinvestment equilibrium, although preferable to the preemptive leader-follower outcome, is seen not to be the fully-optimising choice of cooperating firms. It may, however, be interpreted as the second-best optimum of firms that are constrained to choose a symmetric investment rule, given the difficulty of agreeing an asymmetric investment pattern or making side-payments to support the fully-optimising solution. It is interesting to note that when simultaneous investment is the equilibrium outcome, the time to first investment is increased by strategic interactions between non-cooperative firms, compared with the cooperative solution.
By combining irreversible investment under uncertainty with strategic interactions in the presence of technological uncertainty, the paper brings together three strands of economics literature. Real options models have been used to explain delay and hysteresis arising in a number of contexts, but these are mostly set in a monopolistic or perfectly competitive framework. McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Pindyck (1988) consider irreversible investment opportunities available to a single firm. Dixit (1989 Dixit ( , 1991 considers product market entry and exit in, respectively, monopolistic and perfectly competitive settings. The second branch of related literature analyses timing games of entry and exit in a deterministic framework. Timing games are straightforward examples of stopping time games where the underlying process is simply time itself. Papers analysing preemption games include Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , while wars of attrition have been modelled by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) . Finally, technological uncertainty in R&D, with discovery modelled as a Poisson arrival, is considered in papers by, inter alia, Loury (1979) , Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , Lee and Wilde (1980) , Reinganum (1983) and Dixit (1988) . These papers, however, assume the return to successful R&D (or demand in the product market from which it is derived) to be deterministic, thus ruling out any option value of delay and related timing issues.
Existing literature combining real options with strategic interactions is as yet relatively limited. Smets (1991; summarised in Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 309-314) , examines irreversible market entry for a duopoly facing stochastic demand. Non-cooperative behaviour results in an asymmetric leader-follower equilibrium. When the leadership role is exogenously pre-assigned so that the follower is unable to invest until after the designated leader has done so, the cooperative symmetric outcome may then be attained. Grenadier (1996) considers the strategic exercise of options applied to real estate markets. Joint investment arises only when the underlying stochastic process starts at a sufficiently high initial value and, even then, is not necessarily undertaken at the optimal point. In a twoplayer game where each player's exercise cost is private information, Lambrecht and Perraudin (1997) find trigger points located somewhere between the monopoly and simple NPV outcomes. In a two-period model, Kulatilaka and Perotti (1998) consider the value of strategic investment as the degree of uncertainty increases.
The paper is structured as follows. The model is described in section 2. The optimisation problem of a single firm facing no actual or potential competition is solved in section 3. Section 4 derives the optimal cooperative investment plan for two firms. Noncooperative equilibrium in the two-player game is found in section 5. The findings are discussed in section 6; section 7 then concludes.
The model
Two risk-neutral firms, i = 1, 2, have the opportunity to invest in competing research projects. Research is directly competitive: the firms strive for the same patent and successful innovation by one eliminates all possible profit for the other. The firms face both technological and economic uncertainty. Discovery by an active firm is a Poisson arrival, while the value of the patent received by the successful inventor evolves stochastically over time. 1 The decision to invest in a research project is assumed to be irreversible. The possible states of firm i are denoted
for the idle and active states respectively.
The value of the patent, π, evolves exogenously and stochastically according to a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with drift given by the following expression
where µ ∈ [0, r) is the drift parameter measuring the expected growth rate of π, 2 r is the risk-free interest rate, assumed to be constant over time, σ > 0 is the instantaneous standard deviation or volatility parameter, and dW is the increment of a standard Wiener process where dW ∼ N(0, dt).
Each firm has the opportunity to invest in a research project. Following Loury (1979 . Thus the hazard rate is independent of the duration of research and the number of firms investing; possible variations on this assumption are discussed in section 7. The probabilities of discovery by each firm are independent. We focus on the symmetric case where h h i = and K K i = for i = 1, 2. All parameter values and actions are common knowledge, thus the game is one of complete information.
The following assumptions are made Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 states that the initial value of the patent, 0 π , is sufficiently low that the expected return from immediate investment is negative, ensuring that neither firm will invest at once. Assumption 2 formalises the irreversibility of investment and constrains the strategy of the firm accordingly: if firm i has already invested by date τ then it remains active at all dates subsequent to τ until the game ends with a discovery.
In a multi-agent setting the firm's investment problem can no longer be solved using the optimisation techniques typically employed in real options analysis. Instead, the optimal control problem becomes a stopping time game (for a detailed analysis see Dutta and Rustichini (1991) ). In a stopping time game each player has an irreversible action such that, following this action by one or more players, expected payoffs in the subsequent subgame are fixed. Dutta and Rustichini allow for the possibility that the stochastic process continues to evolve after the leader's action and that the follower still has a move to make, as is the case in this paper. The stopping time game is described by the stochastic process π along with the payoff functions for the leader and follower; these are derived in section 5 below.
The game proceeds as follows. In the absence of action taken by either firm, the stochastic process evolves according to (1 an equilibrium when history-dependent strategies are also permitted, although other nonMarkovian equilibria may then also exist. For further explanation see Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, chapter 13) . With the Markovian restriction a player's strategy is a stopping rule specifying a critical value or "trigger point" for the stochastic variable π at which the firm invests.
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As Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) point out, the use of continuous time complicates the formulation of strategies as there is a loss of information inherent in taking the limit of a discrete time mixed strategy equilibrium. To deal with this problem they extend the strategy space to include not only the cumulative probability that a player has adopted, but also the "intensity" with which a player adopts "just after" the cumulative probability has jumped to one. Although this formulation uses symmetric mixed strategies, equilibrium outcomes are equivalent to those in which firms employ pure strategies and may adopt asymmetric roles.
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Thus, although the underlying framework is an extended space with symmetric mixed strategies, the analysis will proceed as if each firm uses a (possibly asymmetric) pure Markov strategy.
Optimal investment timing for a single firm
We start by deriving the optimal stopping time for a single firm investing in the absence of competition. The firm's investment rule is found by solving the stochastic optimal stopping problem ( )
where E t denotes expectations conditional on information available at time t and T is the Prior to investment the firm holds the option to invest. It has no cashflows but may experience a capital gain or loss on the value of this option. Hence, in the continuation region (values of π for which it is not yet optimal to invest) the Bellman equation for the value of the investment opportunity is given by
Using Itô's lemma and the GBM equation (1) yields the ordinary differential equation
From (1) it can be seen that if π ever goes to zero it stays there forever. Therefore the option to invest has no value when 0 = π and ( ) 
We next consider the value of the firm in the stopping region (values of π for which is it optimal to invest at once). Since investment is irreversible the value of the firm in the stopping region, ( )
, is given by the project expected value alone with no option value terms. Recalling that discovery is a Poisson arrival, the expected value of the active project when the current value of the stochastic process is t π is given by
Recalling that π is expected to grow at rate µ and suppressing time subscripts we can write
Note that the hazard rate h enters the denominator in this expression in the form of an 'augmented discount rate' h r + . This result is typical of models involving a Poisson arrival function: for other examples of this characteristic in the context of R&D see, inter alia, Loury (1979) , Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) , Lee and Wilde (1980) and Dixit (1988) .
The optimal investment rule is found by solving for the boundary between the continuation and stopping regions. This boundary is given by a critical value of the stochastic process, or trigger point, U π such that continued delay is optimal for U π π < and immediate investment is optimal for U π π ≥ . The optimal stopping time U T is then defined as being the first time that the stochastic process π hits the interval
. By arbitrage, the critical value must satisfy the value-matching condition
Optimality requires a second condition known as smooth-pasting to be satisfied. This condition requires the value functions ( )
Conditions (8) and (9) together imply that 
The optimal investment time at which the single firm invests is thus defined as
Briefly considering the properties of the trigger point U π , as economic uncertainty is eliminated (i.e. as σ → 0), 0 β → r/µ and the optimal stopping point approaches the breakeven value of the patent calculated on a simple NPV basis. As uncertainty rises 0 β falls towards unity, raising U π and increasing the expected stopping time. Thus greater uncertainty over patent value delays investment, as expected from the papers by McDonald and Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988) and Dixit (1989) .
The cooperative benchmark
We next consider the benchmark case in which the two firms (or research units) plan their investments cooperatively. 7 The cooperative investment pattern may (in theory at least) take one of two possible forms: either both units invest at a single trigger point, or they invest sequentially at distinct trigger points. We start by deriving the optimal joint-investment rule when firms invest at the same trigger point, which follows straightforwardly from the analysis of section 3. The optimal sequential investment plan is then derived and compared with the optimal joint-investment strategy in order to determine which investment pattern forms the cooperative optimum.
The analysis of the preceding section can be readily extended to the case of two cooperating firms (or research units under common ownership) which agree to adopt a common investment rule. The decision is equivalent to a single firm optimisation problem with an investment cost of 2K and arrival rate 2h. Denoting the optimal joint-investment trigger point by C π , value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are used as before to
The optimal joint investment time C T is analogous to expression (12). As before, the value of a (single) firm under this scenario has two parts. Prior to investment the firm holds the option to invest; after (joint) investment the value of the active project is given by its expected NPV to the firm, taking account of the fact that the other firm is also active, which is ( )
Thus, the value of an individual firm under this scenario is described by the following value function (i.e. the combined firm consisting of two research units has twice this value) Comparing the cooperative trigger point (13) with (10) for the single firm, it can readily be seen that U C π π > . Given that the initial value 0 π is sufficiently low that immediate investment is unprofitable, the ranking of trigger points entails that investment takes place strictly later when two firms agree a common investment rule than when a single firm acts alone. Note that this result is due to the indirect effect of the hazard rate on the implicit discount rate faced by the firm after it invests, which is now h r 2 + rather than h r + .
Since both the cost and hazard rate of research are doubled, there is no direct effect on the efficiency of R&D.
We now characterise the optimal sequential investment plan, on the assumption (for now) that investment takes this form. Suppose that one unit invests at a trigger point 1 π and the other when a second trigger 
The optimal choice of 1 π and 2 π , along with the option value terms 0 A and 1 A , is determined by imposing value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions between the relevant components of the value function at each point. (By contrast, as will be seen in the next section, no smooth-pasting obtains at the leader's investment trigger in the non-cooperative case.) Solving value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at 2 π yields
Imposing value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at 1 π and substituting the above expression for 1 A yields the following implicit expression for 1 π
Lemma 1 completes the proof that the optimal sequential investment plan ( ) (19) and (17) respectively.
Next we compare the trigger points in the optimal cooperative investment pattern with the optimal joint-investment trigger C π .
Lemma 3.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2. The ranking of trigger points in the optimal cooperative investment plan relative to the optimal joint-investment trigger point is given by
Proof. Follows directly from lemmas 2 and 3.
Thus, we have demonstrated that two cooperating firms which jointly optimise their investments would choose to phase their R&D investments progressively over time, rather than invest both research units at once. This is despite the fact that the cost function for research displays constant returns to scale, albeit with a given minimum size of a research unit. The sequential investment pattern gives the possibility of some return even when the value of innovation is fairly low (though NPV-positive), reducing the opportunity cost of delay while holding back from committing all R&D costs at once and retaining an option to increase the scale of investment in the future. The phasing of investment gives the cooperating firms a higher probability of gaining a high-valued patent, and the overall value of the (combined) investment opportunity is thereby maximised.
Non-cooperative equilibrium
We turn now to the non-cooperative two-player game. We start by assuming, without loss of generality, that one firm (the leader) invests strictly before its rival (the follower). As usual in dynamic contexts the stopping time game is solved backwards; thus we start by considering the optimisation problem of the follower.
The follower's investment problem
Given that the leader has already invested and this investment is irreversible, the follower faces a conditional probability hdt that its rival will make the breakthrough in a (short) time interval dt. Moreover, this probability is independent of whether the follower itself has or has not invested. Thus the follower's investment problem is equivalent to that of a single firm with the augmented discount rate h r + . This decision problem can be solved using the method described in section 3, simply replacing r by h r + throughout, to yield the follower's trigger point Denoting the leader's investment time by L T (this being the first time that the leader's trigger point L π is reached, to be defined in section 5.3 below), the follower's optimal investment time can be written as
Note that F π is independent of the point at which the leader invests: given that the firm invests second, the precise location of the leader's trigger point is irrelevant. Comparing F π with the trigger points derived in sections 3 and 4, it can readily be seen that
However F π and U π cannot be ranked in general since, as discussed in the introduction, the leader's hazard rate has two conflicting effects on the follower. The direct effect of the leader's research activity is to reduce the expected value of investment to the follower, which is now given by
in the single-firm case. 9 However, there is also a second effect via the option value mark-up factor, which is now given by
for the single firm. As explained in the introduction, the hazard rate of rival innovation reduces the follower's option value of delay.
This can be seen clearly from the impact of h on the mark-up factor, which is reduced by its presence. This indirect effect tends to speed up the competitive reaction to the leader's investment, mitigating its preemptive advantage.
The leader's payoff
We now derive the payoff to a firm that invests as the leader, given that the follower acts optimally in the future in accordance with the stopping rule derived above. After the leader has sunk the investment cost K it has no further decision to make and its payoff is given by the expected value of its research project. However, this payoff is affected by the subsequent action of the rival firm investing at F π . Taking account of investment by the follower, the leader's post-investment payoff is given by
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Two separate value functions must be considered for the leader: its value before the follower invests, denoted
, and its value after this investment takes place,
Subsequent to investment by the follower the leader's (as well as the follower's) value is given by the expected value of the active research project taking account of the probability of rival discovery, which is simply
given by (14) above. Prior to investment by the follower the leader's value function consists of two components: the expected flow payoff from research and an option-like term that anticipates subsequent investment by the follower. Solving the Bellman equation for the leader's value over this interval, noting that as the value of the patent approaches zero the follower's option to invest becomes worthless and the follower will never enter the race, the following function is derived
is an unknown constant and 1 1 > β is as previously defined.
The value of the unknown constant L B is found by considering the impact of the follower's investment on the payoff to the leader. When F π is first reached the follower invests and the leader's expected flow payoff is reduced, since there is now a positive probability that its rival will make the discovery instead. The first section of the leader's value function anticipates the effect of the follower's action with a value-matching condition holding at F π (for further explanation see Harrison (1985) ). However, since there is no optimality on the part of the leader there is no corresponding smooth-pasting condition in this case. This yields the following value function for a firm investing as the leader (which also takes account of the sunk cost K incurred when the firm invests) 
Solving the game
Without the ability to precommit to trigger points at the start of the game (in contrast with the precommitment strategies used by Reinganum (1981) , for example) the leader's stopping point L π cannot be derived as the solution to a single-agent optimisation problem. Whether a firm becomes a leader, and the trigger point at which it invests if it does so, is determined by the firm's incentive to preempt its rival and the point at which it is necessary to do so to prevent itself from being preempted.
As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , the form of the non-cooperative equilibrium depends on the relative magnitudes of the leader's value, L V , and the value when both delay until the optimal joint-investment point, C V . Depending upon whether or not the functions intersect somewhere in the interval ( )
, two investment patterns arise.
. If L V ever exceeds C V preemption incentives are too strong for a joint-investment equilibrium to be sustained and the only possible outcome is a leader-follower equilibrium in which one firm invests strictly earlier than its rival and both invest strictly prior to the optimal joint-investment time. If, on the other hand, L V never exceeds C V a joint-investment outcome may be sustained, although the leader-follower outcome is also an equilibrium in this case.
At the leader's investment point, L π , the expected payoffs of the two firms must be equal. The reason for this follows Fudenberg and Tirole's rent equalisation principle: if this were not the case, one firm would have an incentive to deviate and the proposed outcome could not be an equilibrium. By investing earlier than its rival the leader gains the advantage of a temporary monopoly in research and has a greater likelihood of making the discovery.
However the value of the prize it stands to win is likely to be lower than for the follower.
Hence, when viewed from the start of the game, there is a trade-off between the probability of being first to make the discovery and the likely value of the prize that is gained. At L π the two effects are in balance and the firms' expected payoffs are equal. Thus, in contrast with many other games where asymmetric equilibria arise (such as Reinganum (1981) ), the agents in this model are indifferent between the two roles.
Before formally describing the equilibria we must first define, and demonstrate the existence of, the leader's trigger point, L π . From the rent equalisation principle described
Using this equality, an implicit expression for L π can be derived; this is given by expression (A4.1) in the appendix evaluated at zero.
Thus it is necessary to prove the existence of a root of this expression other than, and strictly below, F π .
Lemma 4. There exists a unique point
The stopping time of the leader can thus be written as Proof. The proof is illustrated with reference to figure 1. As π rises from its low initial value, we know from the premise that a point (labelled A) will eventually be reached where L V first exceeds C V . At this point each firm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the continuation strategy to become the leader. However, if one firm were to succeed in preempting its rival at A the payoff to the leader would be strictly greater than that of the follower, since
at this point. From Lemma 4 we know that the leader's payoff is strictly greater than that of the follower everywhere in the interval ( )
. Thus preemption incentives rule out any putative trigger point in this range. We know also that
π is reached each firm prefers to let its rival take the lead. We know from Lemma 4 that L π is unique. Once the leader has invested the follower faces a single-agent optimisation problem, the solution to which was derived in section 5.1. Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium configuration in which one firm (the leader) invests when L π is first reached and the other (the follower) invests strictly later at F π . Since the firms' identities are interchangeable there are two equilibria of this type.
Q.E.D.
We next consider the alternative case where C V always exceeds L V and a joint investment equilibrium is sustainable. At C π it is a dominant strategy to invest even though the rival will follow at once, thus there can be no equilibrium trigger point above C π .
Before describing the set of joint-investment equilibria we must first define S π , the lowest joint-investment point such that there is no unilateral incentive to deviate. Note that the critical value S π does not necessarily exist; this depends upon the relative positions of L V
where ( )
is the firm's pre-investment value function when both invest jointly (but not necessarily optimally) at an arbitrary point J π . This function, derived from the valuematching condition at J π , is given by 
Lemma 5.
(a) S π exists and is unique whenever ( ) ( )
forms a connected set such that
Proposition 4. (Case 2). If
, two types of equilibria exist.
The first is the leader-follower equilibrium described in Proposition 3; two equilibria of this type exist as before. The second is a joint-investment equilibrium in which both firms invest at the same trigger point
[ ]
; there is a continuum of equilibrium trigger points over this interval.
Proof. The proof is illustrated with reference to figure 2. As before, fear of preemption by one's rival in the interval ( )
entails that the asymmetric leaderfollower outcome is also an equilibrium configuration in this case. From the premise, however, there is no unilateral incentive to deviate from the continuation strategy anywhere in the interval ( )
it is a dominant strategy to invest, despite the knowledge that the rival will follow at once. Thus the joint-investment outcome in which both firms invest at C π is also an equilibrium. From lemma 5 any joint-investment point
has the property that no unilateral deviation is profitable and is therefore an equilibrium. Q.E.D. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) argue that if one equilibrium Pareto-dominates all others it is the most reasonable outcome to expect. Using the Pareto criterion the multiplicity of equilibria described in Proposition 4 can be reduced to a unique outcome.
Proposition 5. Using the Pareto criterion, the multiplicity of equilibria arising in case 2 can be reduced to a unique outcome. This is the Pareto-optimal joint-investment equilibrium in which both firms invest when C π is first reached.
Proof. The proof consists of two parts.
(i) All joint-investment equilibria, if these exist, Pareto-dominate the asymmetric leaderfollower equilibrium. From the definition of S π any joint-investment trigger point
has the property that no unilateral deviation is profitable; thus
. Thus, the value of continuation is at least as great as the amount that a firm would gain from preemption at any point. Furthermore, in the leaderfollower equilibrium the payoffs of both firms are strictly lower than the maximum amount obtainable, since the optimal preemption strategy is not an equilibrium of the non-cooperative game.
(ii) The joint-investment equilibria are Pareto-ranked by their respective trigger points, with trigger points closer to C π Pareto-dominating all lower ones. This follows directly from the derivation of C π . Q.E.D.
The asymmetric equilibria arising in case 2 are situations where the leader preempts purely because of the fear that its rival will do so first. Such instances of 'attack as a means of defence' are somewhat irrational, as both firms achieve higher payoffs by coordinating on any one of the symmetric equilibria. The Pareto-dominant equilibrium, by contrast, preserves option values and entails that investment is more delayed than in the single-firm counterpart.
Comparing non-cooperative trigger points with those comprising the cooperative solution, derived in the previous section, the following comparisons can be drawn. It is already known from Proposition 2 that (13) and (20) shows that 
Discussion
Comparing cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes, the inefficiency of non-cooperative behaviour can readily be seen. When non-cooperative behaviour results in a leaderfollower equilibrium, preemption and business-stealing incentives prevent the option to invest from being held for long and both firms invest too soon. Although the leader gains the firstmover advantage of a temporary monopoly in research, this is subsequently undermined by the follower's investment. The firms' payoffs are equal, and low compared with the other outcomes.
The alternative joint-investment equilibrium, if achievable, is more favourable for both firms. It is identical to the outcome that would be seen if the firms agreed to adopt a common investment rule and chose this optimally. Although it is not the cooperative optimum -as section 4 has shown, simultaneous investment is dominated by the optimal sequential investment pattern -it could be seen as the best achievable cartel given the difficulty in agreeing asymmetric investment rules and the need for side-payments implicit in the cooperative outcome.
Interestingly, when equilibrium involves simultaneous investment the effect of competition is to increase the time to first investment: the non-cooperative trigger C π exceeds the lower trigger in the cooperative plan, 1 π . Investment occurs too late in this case due to the strategic behaviour of the firms who delay their investment in the fear of setting off a patent race. Hence, in this case, delay is due to strategic interactions between firms, not just the usual option effect of uncertainty. Investment is also more delayed than in the single firm counterpart. When investment does occur, however, a burst of research activity is seen which is then excessive -under the cooperative plan the second investment would be delayed until a later date.
The type of equilibrium that emerges in any particular case depends on the balance between two opposing forces, the option value of delay and the expected benefit of preemption. The simultaneous investment equilibrium becomes more prevalent as the option value of delay is increased or the preemptive effect of earlier investment is reduced.
Numerical analysis indicates that simultaneous investment becomes more likely as, ceteris paribus, volatility σ rises, the hazard rate h falls, 10 or the pure discount rate r increases.
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(As with financial options, an increase in pure discounting reduces the current value of the investment cost, or strike price, paid at some date in the future, raising option values.)
Limiting results as h becomes insignificant or very large are informative. As h tends to zero all trigger points (expressed as an expected flow return, hπ) converge to the same value. This is intuitively obvious: as the business-stealing effect of h becomes negligible, the investment opportunities available to the firms approximate stand-alone options unaffected by competition. As h becomes large on the other hand, the following results are found:
Again, the results are fairly intuitive: U π and C π are the standard trigger points when the return to investment is gained immediately, for investments of scale K and 2K respectively.
In the non-cooperative leader-follower equilibrium, extreme preemption entirely removes the option to delay and firms invest at the simple NPV breakeven points taking account of their respective roles. In the cooperative solution, the first unit invests at the optimal stand-alone trigger point and the second unit is redundant and never invests.
These findings have a number of implications for the understanding and assessment of empirical investment behaviour. Since strategic interactions, in addition to uncertainty, have significant effects on the timing and pattern of investment, empirical studies of investment may be improved by including measures of industry concentration and strategic advantages as explanatory variables. If preemption effects are strong competition tends to speed up investment, which then takes place sequentially as firms avoid competing head-to-head.
Greater volatility, on the other hand, increases the likelihood that a patent race will occur, with a sudden burst of competitive activity ending a prolonged period of stagnation -a phenomenon similar to that described by Choi (1991) but arising for different reasons.
Some welfare implications can also be drawn. Although a full welfare assessment requires a value function for consumers to be specified so that the social optimum can be determined, implications can be drawn straightforwardly from the existing analysis for one simple case. If the consumer surplus arising from the innovation remains in fixed proportion to π as this varies over time (i.e. the patent-holder extracts the same proportion of the social surplus of the innovation at all times), 12 the social optimum coincides with the cooperative solution. 13 In this case the social planner would phase investment progressively over time, choosing the same trigger points as the cooperating firms.
Although patent races are not socially optimal, they may nonetheless be preferable to the alternative non-cooperative equilibrium. Assuming that the welfare optimum is aligned with the cooperative solution as described above, a patent race commencing at the optimal jointinvestment time is preferable to the preemptive leader-follower outcome in which both firms invest too soon and valuable options for the future are destroyed. Only if for some reason early investment has significant external benefits for consumers -and the mere existence of consumer surplus is not sufficient for this -would the social planner prefer the preemptive equilibrium.
Turning next to policy issues, the analysis has implications for the assessment of R&D joint ventures. It provides a possible further justification for adopting a liberal approach to cooperative R&D, in addition to the existing arguments concerning the use of complementary skills, spillover effects, the scale and riskiness of R&D investments. Again, on the broad assumption that the option to delay is socially as well as privately beneficial, the creation of an R&D joint venture with the freedom to choose the timing and scale of R&D investment cooperatively is strongly supported by this analysis. Of course, this and other benefits of cooperation must be balanced against its possible detriments, especially the weakening of efficiency incentives and the extension of cooperation to product market collusion.
It is interesting to note that in the case where a joint venture would be the most desirable, namely that in which a preemptive leader-follower equilibrium would otherwise occur, the joint venture would choose to delay R&D investment. This is in stark contrast with the usual policy approach whereby firms are required to demonstrate that the joint venture will invest in projects that would not otherwise be undertaken (at the present time).
A significant change in approach on the part of competition authorities might be required to take account of this point! When non-cooperative equilibrium takes the simultaneous investment form, however, no such conflict arises: the joint venture will undertake the first investment earlier than would otherwise be the case, and further investment will be phased in at a later date as and when this becomes optimal.
Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that, in contrast to initial expectations, competition between firms does not necessarily undermine the option to delay. Instead, the fear of sparking a patent race may internalise the effect of competition, further raising the value of delay. When firms invest simultaneously in equilibrium, investment occurs later than when the firms plan their investments cooperatively. When this point is reached, however, a patent race ensues as the firms compete to achieve the breakthrough.
The paper has implications for empirical and policy issues. In situations where both option values and strategic interactions are important it is necessary to give careful consideration to precise industry conditions, particularly the degree of uncertainty and strength of preemption, in order to predict and assess the pattern of investment. The analysis suggests that empirical studies of the impact of uncertainty on investment should also include industry concentration and first-mover advantages as explanatory variables in their models. On the policy side, the paper provides a possible additional justification for adopting a permissive view of cooperative R&D joint ventures.
The results are robust to changes in the precise structure of the model. Although geometric Brownian motion is a convenient and tractable form, alternative stochastic processes, such as ones exhibiting mean-reversion or intermittent jumps, would generate similar qualitative results. More sophisticated research technologies could also be considered. For example, the hazard rate may increase with cumulative R&D spending as a result of learning-by-doing. Note that in this case the leader has a permanent rather than a temporary advantage, strengthening preemption incentives. Alternatively, if the probability of discovery is not known a priori and the hazard rate is thus an expectation, updating from fruitless research experience will cause this to fall over time.
The model could be extended in a number of ways. This paper has focused on the symmetric two-firm case. If the firms' research technologies are instead allowed to differ such that one is more efficient, the identities of the leader and follower will be uniquely defined and the more efficient firm will receive a strictly greater expected payoff. An increase in the number of firms, however, is more problematic. As explained by Fudenberg & Tirole (1985, section 5) , rent equalisation holds only in the two-firm case; with three or more symmetric firms equilibrium behaviour is more complicated and asymmetric payoffs are possible. 
is strictly concave over (0, ∞);
(ii) ( )
. This is demonstrated by writing the function evaluated at this point in the form 
Lemma 2. 
As a corollary of lemma 2 we know that the term in square brackets is less than unity (as this is C π / 2 π ). Since Thus, to prove lemma 3 it is sufficient to show that ( ) 0
. This follows from the following facts:
(i) is straightforward. To demonstrate (ii) and (iii) we start by taking partial derivatives with respect to h ( 
Lemma 4. There exists a unique point ( )
Proof. We start by defining the function ( ) ( ) ( )
describing the gain to preempting one's opponent as opposed to being preempted. Expanding using equations (25) and (21) we can write
The following steps are sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a root somewhere in
(ii) Evaluating ( )
Uniqueness of the root L π and the validity of the two inequalities can be proven by demonstrating strict concavity of ( )
. By differentiation we can derive ( ) ( )
Thus the root is unique, with
The final equality is demonstrated by considering the follower's optimal behaviour over the range [ )
. This interval is the follower's stopping region over which its best response to investment by the leader is to invest at once. Thus, the values of the leader and follower are equal over this range. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.
Proof.
(a) To demonstrate existence we start by showing that
. With some simplification, the expressions for J V and C π yield
It then follows from the premise that there exists at least one
: at the very least C π itself satisfies this condition. 1 This value could be interpreted as the expected NPV of profits in the relevant product market or, if further sunk costs are required, might itself be the value of the option to invest in this market, making investment in the research stage a compound option problem.
2 The restriction that µ < r, commonly found in real options models, is necessary to ensure that there is a strictly positive opportunity cost to holding the option, so that it will not be held indefinitely. A large negative drift term would, ceteris paribus, encourage earlier investment to raise the probability of winning the prize before its value declines significantly, counteracting the option effects in the model. To avoid such an outcome we make the assumption that µ is non-negative. Since the model is concerned with the effects of uncertainty, not expected trends, the conclusions from the analysis are unaffected by this assumption. 3 Thus the cost of R&D is fixed, or contractual in the terminology of Kamien and Schwartz (1982) .
4 To be precise, the statement that a firm invests at a trigger point π* means that the firm invests at the time when the stochastic process π first hits the value π*, approaching this level from below. 5 For further details see Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) , section 4.
6 If smooth-pasting were violated and instead a kink arose at U π , a deviation from the supposedly optimal policy would raise the firm's expected payoff. By delaying for a small interval of time after the stochastic process first reached U π , the next step dπ could be observed. If the kink were convex, the firm would obtain a higher expected payoff by entering if and only if π has moved (strictly) above U π , since an average of points on either side of the kink give it a higher expected value than the kink itself. If the kink were concave, on the other hand, second order conditions would be violated. Continuation along the initial value function would yield a higher payoff than switching to the alternative function and switching at U π could not be optimal. More detailed explanation of this condition can be found in appendix C of chapter four in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) . Note that this condition applies for all diffusion processes, not just a geometric Brownian motion such as (1). 7 It is implicitly assumed that side payments may be used to ensure that neither firm has an incentive to deviate; alternatively, the two firms may be separate research units controlled by an integrated firm. 9 An analogous effect is found in the duopoly models of Smets (1991) and Grenadier (1996) . The second, option value effect of rival investment is absent from these models, however. 10 With K adjusted appropriately so that the project's expected value remains constant.
11 With µ adjusted in line so that the opportunity cost µ δ − = r remains constant.
